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This paper investigates whether the filing of a 
Title VII class-action lawsuit initiated a change in 
discriminatory promotion patterns at a regional 
grocery store chain by expanding the empirical 
implementation of hierarchical segregation mod-
els in a panel setting. We develop a variation of 
wage decompositions that takes into consider-
ation an unbalanced panel design and extends the 
literature by explicitly formalizing the inclusion 
of the unobserved heterogeneous effects.
While there have been many studies that pro-
vide an empirical explanation regarding the 
effects of segregation on the gender wage gap (see Kimberly Bayard et al. 2003; Burton Malkiel 
and Judith Malkiel 1973; Elaine Sorenson 1989), 
due to the lack of firm-level data relatively few 
have econometrically explored intra-firm segre-
gation as a mechanism for gender wage gaps. We 
take a particular interest in developing the model 
presented by Marjorie L. Baldwin, Richard J. 
Butler, and William G. Johnson (2001). This 
model of hierarchical segregation depends more 
on the positions of men and women in the hierar-
chy than on reluctance on the part of men to work 
with women. In comparison with other firm-level 
methodologies, Baldwin, Butler, and Johnson (2001) claim that the advantage of their model is 
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the ability to identify a segregation term without 
having to specify a job title aggregation. In this 
empirical approach, job titles are  considered to be 
a continuous function of wages, and thus one can 
avoid the empty cell problem created when includ-
ing job title indicators in wage specifications.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, 
we utilize unique firm-level data to evaluate 
panel methodologies that incorporate wage 
decompositions with the standard human capital 
specification. Particularly in unionized firms, the 
rules for setting wages require that individuals 
of the same experience level and job title be paid 
the same wage. In such a setting, standard prac-
tices such as specifying the Mincerian variables 
in a wage model lead to misspecification and 
misinterpretation of the relationship between 
wages and other factors. As a result, we examine 
the robustness of this hierarchical segregation 
model in an institutional setting in which overt 
wage discrimination within unionized job titles 
is nonexistent. Second, we extend the model of 
hierarchical segregation to use in a panel setting.
Our data span the years 1977 through 1985, 
and come from a regional grocery store that 
faced a title VII class-action lawsuit alleging 
gender discrimination in job assignment and 
failing to promote women into the managerial 
positions, much the same as Costco and Walmart 
face today. The firm was found guilty of dis-
crimination in 1984 and negotiated a settlement 
that required payment of “back pay” as well as 
the implementation of affirmative action policies 
for promotion and job assignment. Although the 
affirmative action policies were not implemented 
prior to the year-end of 1986, Ransom and 
Oaxaca (2005) find evidence that the employer 
was already taking corrective action after the fil-
ing of the lawsuit in 1982. We are interested in 
exploiting the panel nature of the data to exam-
ine any structural change resulting from the fil-
ing of the lawsuit. However, prior to answering 
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the question of interest, we first explore the spe-
cial decomposition issues that arise in a panel 
setting, as well as determine the robustness of 
the Mincerian specification in a setting where 
both the institutional details of the firm and the 
outcome of the court  decision are known. We 
approach the evaluation from the perspective of 
a researcher who does not know the institutional 
details governing the actual wage and job assign-
ment structure. Theoretically, the entire wage 
gap should be attributed to some combination of 
hierarchical segregation and worker heterogene-
ity, since the hierarchical wage structure of the 
firm is set by gender neutral union contracts for 
hourly wage workers. Assuming wages follow a 
lognormal distribution, we derive, estimate, and 
decompose changes in hierarchical segregation 
over time using fixed effects.
I. Model
The advantage of modeling hierarchical seg-
regation using panel methods is that it allows 
one to control for omitted variables that differ 
between workers but are constant over time. In a 
cross-sectional analysis, these omitted variables 
can bias coefficient estimates, especially if they 
are themselves an outcome of discrimination (Sharmila Choudhury 1993).
The Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is easily 
extended in the panel framework to measure 
the contribution of wage discrimination and 
human capital accumulation on the gender wage 
gap over time. In the context of fixed effects, 
researchers have built upon the decomposition 
by using the within-coefficient estimates and 
the overall mean (over time and individuals). 
However, the within-transformation of the data 
dispenses with the constant term. As a result, the 
sample mean wages differ from the predicted 
value of wages by a constant and yield biased 
decomposition results (Axel Heitmuller 2005). 
We utilize the individual fixed effects, which 
are particularly important when executing wage 
decompositions with unbalanced panel data.
The fixed-effects wage regressions for men 
and women in a balanced design are typically 
modeled as the following:
(1) ln  w mit =  x mit β m +  α mi +  ε mit ,
(2) ln  w fit =  x fit β f * +  α fi * +  ε fit ,
where  β f * =  β f /γ,  α fi * =  α fi /γ, subscripts i and 
t refer to individuals and time, respectively. α i  is the fixed effect component, and  ε it is the 
error component that varies over individuals and 
time. Notice that γ is the coefficient of segrega-
tion and will take on a value of one if there is 
no hierarchical segregation. We estimate equa-
tion (1) and equation (2) separately and retrieve 
the segregation parameter as γ =  σ mε 2 /  σ f ε 2 .1 To 
obtain an overall constant term for the individual 
fixed effects, we can implement the following 
normalization:
(3)  ∑ 
i=1
 N j 
  α ji = 0, j = m,  f.
This will result in a constant term for males 
and females that is simply the average of the 
individual fixed effects. Consequently, the nor-
malization in equation (3) equates the sample 
mean log wages to the predicted log wages; 
however, more work is required in the case of 
the wage-level decompositions, where the pre-
dicted wage levels will not correspond to the 
sample mean wages.2 To also take into account 
the unbalanced design of the data, we start with 
expressions for the sample means of the true 
individual conditional mean wages:
 w m 
e
 =  ( _ tm  n m ) −1 ∑ 
i=1
 n m 
  ∑ 
t=1
 t im 
E  ( w mit |  x mit ,  α mi ) 
 =  ( _ tm  n m ) −1 ∑ 
i=1
 n m 
  ∑ 
t=1
 t im 
e xp( x mit β m +  α mi 
 + 0.5  σ εm 2 ),
 w f 
e =  ( _ tf  n f ) −1 ∑ 
i=1
 n f 
  ∑ 
t=1
 t if 
 E ( w fit |  x fit , α fi ) 
 = ( _ tf n f ) −1 ∑ 
i=1
 n f 
  ∑ 
t=1
 t if 
   exp(  x fit  β f +  α fi  _γ  + 0.5 σ εf 2 ),
1 See Baldwin, Butler, and Johnson (2001) to understand 
the identification of γ in the wage model. See Shatnawi, 
Oaxaca, and  Ransom (2010) for an alternative identification 
strategy, as well as the evaluation in the Baldwin, Butler, and 
Johnson (2001) model in the cross-sectional setting. 
2 We believe that decompositions in wage levels is impor-
tant because it may be instructive for the participants of 
discrimination lawsuits to understand the magnitude of the 
wage gaps in terms of the actual dollar units rather than loga-
rithmic wages. 
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where  
_ tm =  ∑ i=1  n m  t im / n m ;  
_ tf =  ∑ i=1  n  f   t if / n  f ; and 
n m and  n f are the number of unique male and 
female workers. Note that the individual fixed 
effects are required in the decomposition.
In order to operationalize the decomposition, 
we replace the parameters by their estimated 
values and we incorporate remainder terms that 
equate the predicted mean wages with the actual 
sample mean wages. Predicted individual wages 
that average to the sample means are derived as 
follows:
  w mit =  exp( x  mit   βm +   α  mi + 0.5  σεm 2 +   θm ),
  w fit =  exp(  x  fit  βf +   α fi  _  γ  + 0.5  σεf 2 +   θf ),
where   θm and   θf are remainder terms that equate 
the means of the predicted wages for males and 
females to their sample means, i.e.,
   θm = ℓn( _ tm  n m _ wm )
 − ℓn { ∑ 
i
 




 t im [ exp( x mit   βm +   α mi + 0.5  σεm 2 )]} ,
   θf = ℓn( _ tf  n f  _ wf  )
 − ℓn { ∑ 
i
 
 n f 
  ∑ 
t
 
 t if 
 [ exp(  x  fit  βf +   α fi  _  γ  + 0.5  σεf 2 )]} ,
where  
_ w =  ∑ i n ∑ t t w it /nt is the overall sample 
mean wage and   α i =  _ ln w i −  _ xi   β is the estimated 
individual fixed effect. After some algebraic 
manipulations, we obtain a wage decomposition 
for this case:
(4)  = w m −  = w f = exp(0.5  ˆ    σεm 2 +  ˆ   θm )
  × [( _ tm  n m ) −1 ∑ 
i=1
 n m 
   ∑ 
t=1
 t im 
 exp( x mit  ˆ   βm +  ˆ    αmi )
 − ( _ tf  n f  ) −1 ∑ 
i=1
 n f 
   ∑ 
t=1
 t if 
  exp( x fit  ˆ   βm +  ˆ    αmi )]
 + ( _ tf  n f  ) −1 exp(0.5  ˆ    σεm 2 +  ˆ   θm ) 
  × {  ∑ 
i=1
 n f 
  ∑ 
t=1
 t if 
    [exp( x fit  ˆ   βm +  ˆ    αmi ) 
  − exp( x fit  ˆ   βf +  ˆ    αfi )]}
 + ( _ tf  n f ) −1 exp( ˆ   θf )
 × {  ∑ 
i=1
 n f 
   ∑ 
t=1
 t if 
   [exp( x fit   ˆ   βf +  ˆ    αfi  + 0.5  σεm 2 ) 
 − exp(  x  fit  βf +   α fi  _  γ  + 0.5    σεm 2  _ ˆ   γ  )]}
 + ( _ tf  n f  ) −1 [  ∑ 
i=1
 n f 
  ∑ 
t=1
 t if 
 e xp( x fit  ˆ   βf +  ˆ    αfi + 0.5  σεm 2 )]
 × [exp( ˆ   θm ) − exp( ˆ   θf )].
The first two terms in (4) are the empirical esti-
mates of the gender wage gap attributable to 
individual characteristics and wage discrimi-
nation, which are analogous to the standard 
Oaxaca decomposition. The third term measures 
the portion of the wage gap attributed to hierar-
chical segregation, and the fourth term captures 
the sample mean wage difference due to gender 
differences in the deviation between sample 
mean wages and predicted mean wages.
II. Results
This section presents the regression and 
decomposition results obtained using fixed 
effects. The wage models incorporate the 
Mincerian specification by including age, age-
squared, seniority, and seniority-squared as 
explanatory variables. Note that the union con-
tracts did specify that employees with higher 
seniority get paid a wage premium within a par-
ticular job title and required that the most senior 
employee be considered for a higher position. In 
fact, in the history of the firm’s existence, there 
were no female store managers prior to the filing 
of the lawsuit. Furthermore, women had higher 
seniority on average within job titles.3 Although 
the Mincerian quadratic in age and tenure speci-
fication is commonly used in both market and 
firm-level settings, in reality there are  seniority 
3 Contact authors for the summary statistics of this firm. 
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steps within firms and job titles at any given 
point in time. Our firm is no exception, even if 
the specification makes intuitive sense.
For the purpose of this study, we divide the 
dataset into two separate panels, one that includes 
the years prior to the lawsuit (1977–1981) and 
the other the years after the filing of the lawsuit (1982–1985). Dividing the data in this way, as 
opposed to using the entire sample, provides a 
way to measure the extent that the filing of the 
lawsuit influenced changes in hierarchical segre-
gation. We do so because the identifying strategy 
used for the model forces the segregation param-
eter to be constant over time, and we know there 
was a structural shift after the lawsuit was filed.
The coefficient estimates for the fixed-effects 
regressions before and after the lawsuit are pre-
sented in Table 1. Our findings indicate that the 
distribution of males and females is not equal-
ized across job titles, given that coefficient of 
segregation, γ, is greater than one in both regres-
sions. However, the level of hierarchical segre-
gation dramatically decreases after the filing of 
the lawsuit as γ reduces from 2.0288 to 1.2968. 
Notice that the results have the correct theoreti-
cal signs for the Mincerian specification.
The wage-level decomposition results are pro-
vided in Table 2. Most researchers have been 
satisfied with performing log wage decompo-
sitions evaluated at the overall sample mean 
 characteristics; however, in terms of public pol-
icy, the interpretation of the results can be very 
misleading.
Utilizing the individual fixed effects for each 
worker, we find that hierarchical segregation 
reduces from 68.7 percent of the wage gap prior 
to the lawsuit to 10.12 percent after the filing of 
the lawsuit. The decomposition is misleading in 
terms of the firm’s actual wage structure, as the 
decomposition suggests that women are being 
overpaid within job titles. This is indicated by 
the negative sign on the discrimination compo-
nent. We find that the Mincerian specification, 
when embedded in the hierarchical model, leads 
to misinterpretation of the contribution of dis-
crimination to the wage gap. These results are 
unsettling because the Mincerian specification 
typically models wages accurately for heter-
ogenous data or aggregated data and its use is 
common practice in the labor literature when 
the institutional details are unknown. However, 
we know that wages within job titles were deter-
mined by gender neutral union contracts; thus, 
there should be no wage “discrimination” within 
job titles. Instead we should expect to see the 
hierarchical component be the dominant effect. 
Furthermore, the magnitudes of the results are 
quite large. After the filing of the lawsuit we do 
see the percentage of the wage gap due to intra-
firm segregation and discrimination decrease. 
Table 1—Fixed-Effects Estimates and Decomposition before and after 1982
Before 1982 After 1982
Male Female Male Female
Constant −6.395 −8.629 −2.579 −2.803
[0.147]*** [0.448]*** [0.310]*** [0.373]***
Age 0.315 0.326 0.186 0.163
[0.008]*** [0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]***
Age2 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Tenure 0.066 0.02 0.007 0.029
[0.006]*** [0.014] [0.013] [0.012]**
Tenure    2 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
 σ 2 0.0150 0.0074 0.0062 0.0048
γ — 2.0288 — 1.2968
Observations 5,168 3,327 4,285 2,942
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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And women gain the advantage in human 
 capital accumulation. When we constrain the 
model such that there is no within-job title dis-
crimination, the decomposition results improve 
in terms of magnitude.4 The hierarchical segre-
gation component is the dominant explanation 
for why women earned less than men on aver-
age at this firm. We continue to observe a drop 
in the segregation parameter after the filing of 
the lawsuit, although segregation is never fully 
eliminated.
III. Conclusion
This study provides a framework for evaluat-
ing decompositions in a panel setting using the 
hierarchical segregation methodology originally 
developed by Baldwin, Butler, and Johnson (2001). We believe that our contribution of 
including the cross-sectional heterogenous 
effects and accounting for the unbalanced nature 
of the data can easily be extended in the most 
simple decomposition. It is difficult to imagine 
a case where labor market data from a single 
firm will be balanced. While estimation of the 
fixed-effects coefficients are not affected by the 
unbalanced nature of the data, the derivation 
and results of the decomposition will be altered. 
Further investigation is required to better specify 
the wage models when the institutional details 
of the firm are unknown.
4 In this case the wage structure can still be represented 
by the Mincerian variables. The data are pooled and the 
segregation parameter is identified by jointly estimating the 
male and female equation through Maximum Likelihood. 
See Shatnawi, Oaxaca, and Ransom (2005) for the cross-
sectional analogue. Contact authors for the results of the 
constrained decomposition. 
Table 2—Wage-Level Decomposition before and after 1982
Before 1982 After 1982
Wage gap
Percentage 
of gap Wage gap
Percentage 
of gap
Endowment 2.3837 7.7867 −6.1823 −7.3231
Discrimination −23.0651 −75.3456 −1.4968 −1.7731
Segregation 21.0545 68.7776 8.5414 10.1175
Nonlinear −0.0669 −0.2187 −0.0181 −0.0214
Total 0.3061 1 0.8487 1
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